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ABSTRACT 
This paper introduces a new perspective on the impacts of tourism on host communi-
ties by analyzing the links between tourism specialization and quality of institutions. Our 
research has two principal aims: firstly, to test the significance and sign of this relationship; 
and secondly, to explore the channels through which tourism could affect institutional qual-
ity. To this end, an econometric analysis is conducted using a sample of 92 countries over 
the period 1995-2014. The results indicate that there is a significant and positive associa-
tion between tourism specialization and institutional quality. Moreover, this relation can be 
explained through three main channels: level of income, income inequality, and economic 
freedom. 
Keywords: tourism impact, tourism specialization, quality of institutions, level of 
income, income inequality, economic freedom. 
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Explorando las relaciones entre especialización turística y calidad institucional
RESUMEN
Este trabajo aporta una nueva perspectiva sobre los impactos del turismo analizando 
las relaciones entre la especialización turística de un país y la calidad de sus instituciones. 
La investigación plantea dos objetivos: (1) testar empíricamente la significatividad y signo 
de dichas relaciones y (2) explorar los canales a través de los que se producen. Realizamos 
un análisis econométrico para 92 países y 20 años. Los principales resultados indican la 
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existencia de una asociación significativa y positiva entre turismo y calidad institucional que 
se produce principalmente a través de tres canales: nivel de renta, distribución de la renta y 
libertad económica.
Palabras clave: Impactos del turismo, especialización turística, calidad institucional, 
nivel de renta, distribución de la renta, libertad económica. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper addresses the relationships between tourism specialization and quality of 
institutions at a country level. With this study, we intend to contribute to improving the 
understanding of the impacts of tourism activity on the destinations where this activity 
develops. The knowledge of these effects can help those responsible for tourism planning to 
establish those measures that encourage the positive effects and mitigate the negative ones.
There is no doubt that tourism affects many aspects of life of the local residents of 
tourist destinations and can become an important element of territorial development. 
However, the development of tourism is not without risk, as it can also be responsible for 
adverse effects on the community. The study of the impact of tourism therefore constitu-
tes a topic that has been widely discussed in both the scholarly literature (Sinclair, 1998; 
Wall and Matthieson, 2006; Uysal et al., 2016 have all reviewed these studies) and in 
institutions (WTO, 2005; 2015). 
There are several kinds of tourism impacts, all of which form part of an interrelated com-
plex system. The majority of the studies tend to divide these impacts into three categories: (1) 
economic, (2) socio-cultural, and (3) environmental impacts; and these in turn can be either 
positive or negative. First, economic impacts include aspects such as increased investment 
and provision of jobs, improved income, and levying of additional tax revenues, but can also 
involve inflation and increases in the cost of living. Socio-cultural impacts cover elements 
such as greater recreation opportunities, opportunities for socializing with visitors, fostering 
cross-cultural understanding, and resurgence of traditional culture, but may also increase 
crime rates and changes in traditional cultures. Lastly, environmental impacts include 
increased environmental awareness, and preservation of natural and cultural resources, but 
can also imply crowding, pollution, vandalism, litter, and destruction of the local wildlife.
A proper planning of tourism activity requires the knowledge of the impact of tou-
rism and understanding the mechanisms through which these impacts spread. This will 
help ensure that tourism development will lead to higher levels of quality of life of host 
communities.
Although the quality of institutions is one of the key elements for the improvement 
of the quality of life of a society (Kim and Kim, 2012), there is only a limited amount of 
scientific literature regarding the impacts of tourism on institutional quality from a theo-
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retical perspective; the literature from an empirical perspective remains in even shorter 
supply. Furthermore, the scarce research on the subject explores these relationships par-
tially or indirectly. Only a specific aspect of institutional quality has been considered (Das 
and Di Renzo, 2010 and Poprawe, 2015 study corruption) or only a specific dimension of 
tourism has been examined (Lee, 2015 analyzes tourism competitiveness). Finally, Brau et 
al. (2011) and Altin et al. (2017) study the relationships between tourism and institutional 
quality in only an indirect way.
This paper strives to fill the gap left unfulfilled by the aforementioned studies. The 
main goal here is to determine whether there is a significant relationship between the 
specialization in tourism of a country and the quality of its institutions. If this is the case, 
then the objective becomes the determination of the sign of the relation and the underlying 
mechanisms that explain such a relation.
To achieve our goals, we use a sample of 92 countries over the period 1995-2014. Our 
econometric analysis shows that there is a significant and positive association between 
tourism specialization and institutional quality. Moreover, it indicates that this relationship 
is explained mainly through three of the four channels proposed: level of income (40%), 
income inequality (25%), and economic freedom (4%).
This paper makes three principal contributions that may be useful for the improve-
ment of tourism planning and the quality of institutions. On the one hand, it extends the 
literature on impacts of tourism on host societies by examining the relations between 
tourism and institutional quality. On the other hand, it extends the literature on institu-
tional quality by analyzing its relation with sectoral specialization. Finally, to the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first study that evaluates the channels through which tourism 
affects institutional quality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a review of the 
literature and the theoretical framework on which our model is based. Section 3 describes 
the data and variables. Section 4 offers the econometric model, the estimation approach, 
and discusses the results of the analysis concerning the relationship between tourism and 
quality of institutions. Finally, Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS
The relationship between tourism and quality of the institutions of the societies where 
it is developed has, hitherto, been little studied. In addition, this limited research explores 
such relationships only partially or indirectly (Das and Di Renzo, 2010; Brau et al., 2011; 
Lee, 2015; Poprawe, 2015). The specific links that can be established between the two 
issues remain uncertain. 
Lee (2015) employs a cross-country regression analysis of 117 countries and finds that 
quality of government is positively associated with international tourism competitiveness 
(Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Index). Furthermore, this study concluded that the 
positive effect of quality of government is independent from the effect of democracy.
Moreover, Das and Di Renzo (2010) and Poprawe (2015) focus on the analysis of the 
relationship between tourism and on one specific dimension of institutional quality: that of 
corruption. Das and Di Renzo (2010) provide evidence for 119 countries that a reduction 
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in corruption causes a positive impact on the level of tourism competitiveness (Travel and 
Tourism Competitiveness Index). They also find that “developing nations enjoy a larger 
marginal gain in tourism competitiveness compared to developed countries as a result of 
a reduction in corruption levels” (Das and Di Renzo 2010: 489). Poprawe (2015) tests 
the hypothesis that corruption has a negative effect on tourism, using a panel data set of 
over 100 countries and 16 years. 
Brau et al. (2011) evaluate whether the positive role of the tourism sector for growth 
varies depending on the quality of institutions, and employ a large sample of countries 
covering the period 1980–2007. They conclude the positive effect of tourism development 
on aggregate growth acts independently of a country’s institutional quality. 
The above studies constitute just the beginning of research in this area. It is therefore 
necessary further study into the relationship between tourism and institutional quality in 
order to understand the channels through which tourism can affect this quality.
For a better understanding of this relation, we will distinguish between the total effect 
and its decomposition into direct and indirect effects.
2.1. Total effect 
The total effect of tourism on institutional quality is derived from the specific characte-
ristics of this sector: (a) experience good, (b) importance of public services, (c) importance 
of image, (d) existence of market failures.
The tourism product is considered as an experience good (Hunt, 1975). Tourists often 
have little or no first-hand knowledge of the destination before travelling, and hence have 
had no opportunity to test the product before purchasing. In these cases, the image beco-
mes a key factor in choosing a destination (Oh et al., 2007; Yuan and Wu, 2008). 
In this regard, there are studies that have shown that both corruption and political ins-
tability tarnish a country’s image or destination brand (Das and Di Renzo, 2010; Poprawe, 
2015). Corruption, in addition to damaging the image, usually incurs higher costs for both 
tourists and investors, thereby representing a loss of competitiveness for the destination 
(Dwyer and Kim, 2003; Enright and Newton, 2004; 2005)
On the other hand, the image perceived by tourists is closely linked with both quantity 
and quality of public services they have received at the destination: cleanliness, air and 
noise pollution, traffic congestion, security and safety, overcrowding, state of infrastruc-
ture, and the preservation of historical and natural heritage, among others (Beerli and 
Martin, 2004). These services, in turn, are directly related to the quality and flexibility 
of the existing institutions in host communities, since it is these institutions which must 
ultimately provide the services.
The image of a destination exhibits most of the features of a public good. Therefore, 
public sector intervention is important in achieving an image consistent with the objectives 
of the tourism sector. Furthermore, quality institutions are needed in order to coordinate 
the interests of the various stakeholders in tourism in order to present a coherent image 
(Higgins-Desbiolles, 2006). 
In the latter sense, as suggested by Sinclair (1998), tourism presents other market 
failures, which explains why it is especially important to have quality institutions to over-
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come these failures and to ensure the success of the sector. Failures of the tourist market 
include the noticeable concentration in certain segments (tour operators, air transport, etc.), 
problems of asymmetric information, and both positive and negative externalities (tourism 
directly affects the lives of host communities and can cause significant economic, social and 
environmental impacts). In addition, tourism could give rise to problems in the distribution 
of income (from the point of view of temporal and spatial and personnel distribution). 
Given the above features, the development of tourism should not be solely left to the 
mercy of market forces if its benefits are to be secured (OECD, 1991; Hall and Page, 
2006). As early as 1974, the International Union of Tourism Organizations identified five 
areas of public sector involvement in tourism: coordination, planning, legislation, regula-
tion, and entrepreneur stimulation (IUTO, 1974).
For all these reasons, countries seeking a competitive specialization in sustainable 
tourism over time will have greater incentives to improve their institutional quality by 
enhancing the quality of their bureaucracy, controlling corruption, and ensuring a strong 
and impartial legal system (law and order).
In addition to those incentives through which tourism can generate positive impacts on 
institutional quality, there are forces acting in the opposite direction, particularly in certain 
specific tourism typologies. Nkyi and Hashimoto (2014) overview existing evidence in the 
literature about growing incidences of human rights abuses in the tourism industry. These 
include inhuman treatment of people (slavery, sexual exploitation, human trafficking, child 
exploitation for labour), labour rights violation, restrictions on the freedom of settlement 
and movement, unfair business competition between local small business entities and 
multi-national corporations, and environmental exploitation.
Building on the above considerations, we establish the first hypothesis of our work:
H1: There is a link between tourism specialization and the quality of institutions
Having found that there are theoretical arguments that justify the existence of links 
between tourism and institutional quality, we explore the main channels through which 
these associations may occur. In this respect, we decompose the total effect into direct 
and indirect effects. The indirect effects are those induced by various channels, whereby 
tourism exerts an impact on the channels and these in turn have an effect on the quality 
of institutions. The direct effect is defined in this paper as a residual, that is, the part of 
the total effect that cannot be explained with the channels.
2.2. Indirect effects: channels
Tourism can affect institutional quality by influencing its determinants. In this paper, 
we will consider channels to be the determinants of institutional quality in which there is 
clear evidence of their link with tourism.
There is a vast literature dedicated to the search for determinants of the quality of ins-
titutions. These can be classified into two main groups: stable determinants and changing 
determinants. The former covers historical (colonial and legal origin), geographical, cultural 
and ethnic factors (see Acemoglu et al. 2001; La Porta et al., 1999; Auer, 2013; Alesina and 
Giuliano, 2015; and Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005, respectively). In the latter, we find edu-
cation, economic determinants, and political institutions. In order to select the channels, we 
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have focused on the economic determinants given that they could be more closely related to 
tourism. Economic factors include level of income, openness, inequality in the distribution 
of income, market competition measured as economic freedom, and economic variables 
related to the government in the form of the tax system or government expenditure (for a 
review of changing determinants, see Alonso and Garcimartín, 2013; and Treisman, 2007). 
Among all these determinants, we have selected those that the literature links to tourism: 
level of income, income inequality, economic freedom, and international openness.
Tourism and Level of Income 
The links between tourism and level of income have been widely studied by the scien-
tific literature both from a theoretical and empirical perspective for decades (see Sinclair, 
1998 and Pablo-Romero and Molina, 2013 for reviews of the literature). Despite using 
different methodologies, different samples, and obtaining different results, most of these 
studies aim to verify the tourist-led growth hypothesis. 
Several studies focus on the estimation of income generation via the multiplier pro-
cess using Input–Output Analysis, on Computable General Equilibrium models, and on 
Tourism Satellite Accounts (Fletcher and Archer, 1991; Dwyer et. al., 2004; Ivanov and 
Webster, 2007; Kadiyali and Kosová, 2013).
Other studies have examined the causal relationships between tourism and growth, as 
well as tourism potential to affect growth through various channels: exports, tax revenue, 
employment creation, investment, productive diversification, enhancing efficiency, and 
gains from economies of scale, among others. These studies use a range of econometric 
methodologies: time series, panel-data, and cross-sectional analyses (Brau et al., 2011; 
Lejarraga and Walkenhorst, 2013). Although their results differ, there is evidence of the 
existence of a clear relationship between tourism and economic growth (82 out of the 86 
studies analyzed in Pablo-Romero and Molina, 2013, show a connection between the two 
issues). Furthermore, most conclude that specialization is relevant in tourism in order for 
it to affect growth; however, these studies also provide evidence of a decreasing marginal 
effect of tourism on economic growth over time.
Tourism and Income Inequality
The majority of the studies analyzing the relationship between tourism and income 
inequality have investigated from the point of view of spatial distribution.
The effects of tourism on personal income distribution have remained less studied by 
the academic literature. These studies generally use a Gini coefficient or a Lorenz curve 
and their results are mixed, although the strength and direction of links between tourism 
and income distribution seem to be very sensitive to the choice of country and remain 
context-specific.
Blake (2008), in his analysis of household income in East Africa, finds that tourism-
related industries provide substantially less income for poorer segments of the population 
than other export activities. Likewise et al. (2008) conclude from applied General Equili-
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brium Analysis that tourism development has adverse effects on income distribution in the 
Thai economy. Leatherman and Marcouller (1996, 1999), using Social Accounting Matrix, 
found that tourism development benefits especially upper- and lower-income categories in 
rural economies. The results of Wagner (1997) are in the same vein.
In contrast, Croes and Vanegas (2008) study the Nicaraguan economy and they provide 
evidence of the existence of a relation between tourism development and poverty reduc-
tion. In this vein, Casas Jurado et al. (2012) show the role of tourism in the eradication of 
poverty in Peru using a case study. Lee and Kang (1998) obtain similar results for South 
Korea; in general, tourism provokes a more evenly spread earnings distribution than do 
secondary and tertiary industries. These results are mainly due to the characteristics of 
tourism employment: it is of a labour-intensive nature; and it absorbs many unskilled and 
semi-skilled workers and female workers. Thus, the tourism employment is more likely 
to improve living standards for those of a lower income. 
Finally, Marcouiller et al. (2004) offers contradictory evidence in a country-level 
model for the US lake states.
Tourism and Economic Freedom 
Although the relationship between tourism and economic freedom has yet to be suffi-
ciently studied, in general there seems to be a broad consensus in the literature that shows 
a positive and significant relationship between economic freedom and competitiveness of 
a tourist destination (Dwyer and Kim, 2003; Enright and Newton, 2004; 2005; Das and 
Di Renzo, 2010). Das and Di Renzo (2010: 481) conclude that “tourism tends to thrive 
in stable economic and business environments where institutions and policies are open, 
consistent and free, and where countries have greater levels of economic freedom”.
Lejarraga and Walkenhorst (2013: 3) indicate that factors such as “the business envi-
ronment, such as corporate tax rate, labor market regulations, and internet usage, as well 
as trade regulations, such as tariff and non-tariff measures, have the most pronounced 
impact on the formation of tourism linkages” with the general economy. These factors are 
all related with economic freedom.
Tourism and International Openness 
In the same way as for economic freedom, most of the literature finds a positive rela-
tionship between international openness and tourism competitiveness. Thus, Gooroochurn 
and Sugiyarto (2005) found trade openness to be a significant determinant of tourism 
competitiveness. Ivanov and Webster (2013) show tourism is a function of globalization 
because the globalization process expedites the flow of travellers and investors across 
national borders. Likewise, the research of Lejarraga and Walkenhorst (2013) shows that 
an open trading environment encourages more linkages between tourism and the general 
economy than protectionist policies. 
On the other hand, Poprawe (2015) and Lee (2015) introduced international openness 
as a control variable in its analysis of the relations between tourism and institutional 
quality (Poprawe, 2015 uses the Index for trade openness and Lee, 2015 the Index of 
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globalization). Both studies conclude that there is a positive and significant relationship 
between tourism and openness.
In this respect, it is also important to note countries with greater tourist specialization 
are, in most cases, small economies, and consequently open countries (Brau et al., 2011).
Based on the above, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H2: There is a link between tourism specialization and institutional quality through 
the following channels: level of income, income inequality, economic freedom and inter-
national openness 
We propose the following theoretical model (Figure 1) in order to test our hypotheses.
Figure 1 
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Note: The dashed lines represent the indirect effect and the solid line describes the direct effect. 
In Section 3, a description is given of the variables included in the model, the index chosen for each 
of the variables, and the data source used. In Section 4, this model is specified in a set of equations 
which will be estimated using econometric techniques. 
3. DATA AND VARIABLES 
In order to test the existence of a relationship between specialization in tourism and institutional 
quality, data from of 92 countries from 1995 to 2014 is used. The total period has been divided into 
two sub-periods: 1995-2004 and 2005-2014.   
Moreover, only those countries for which there is data available for all variables have been 
considered. Table A1 in Appendix 1 shows the countries included for each of the sub-periods. 
A description and justification is then given of the variables used in our analysis and the index 
chosen for each of them.  
3.1. Quality of institutions  
The quality of institutions is our dependent variable. We have chosen the indicator available at the 
Dahlberg et al. (2016) constructed from the data produced by the firm Political Risk Services 
(PRS), based on evaluations by its network of experts and published in its International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG).  
This indicator is the mean value of the ICRG indexes for Corruption, Law and Order, and 
Bureaucracy Quality. These variables are closely related to the aforementioned characteristics of 
tourism that explain its potential relationship with institutional quality 
These indexes have been scaled from 0 to 10, where higher values indicate higher quality of 
institutions. Dahlberg et al. (2016: 79) point out “that the index of Corruption is an assessment of 
co ruption within the political system”. It is concerned with actual or potential corruption in the 
form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, bribes, clientelism, and/or favouritism. It 
captures the likelihood that high government officials will demand special payments and the extent 
to which illegal payments are expected throughout government tiers. According to Dahlberg et al. 
(2016: 80), “the Law and Order index is twofold. The Law sub-component is an assessment of the 
strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the Order sub-component is an assessment of the 
popular observance of the law”. Finally, these authors indicate that the Bureaucracy Quality index 
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Moreover, only those countries for which there is data available for all variables have 
been considered. Table A1 in Appendix 1 shows the countries included for each of the 
sub-periods.
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This indicator is the mean value of the ICRG indexes for Corruption, Law and Order, 
and Bureaucracy Quality. These variables are closely related to the aforementioned cha-
racteristics of tourism that explain its potential relationship with institutional quality
These indexes have been scaled from 0 to 10, where higher values indicate higher 
quality of institutions. Dahlberg et al. (2016: 79) point out “that the index of Corruption 
is an assessment of corruption within the political system”. It is concerned with actual or 
potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, bribes, 
clientelism, and/or favouritism. It captures the likelihood that high government officials 
will demand special payments and the extent to which illegal payments are expected 
throughout government tiers. According to Dahlberg et al. (2016: 80), “the Law and Order 
index is twofold. The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and impartiality 
of the legal system, while the Order sub-component is an assessment of the popular obser-
vance of the law”. Finally, these authors indicate that the Bureaucracy Quality index refers 
to the autonomy of bureaucracy from political pressure. A high value implies that changes 
in the government do not lead to drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government 
services. Low values are given to countries where a change in government tends to be 
traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions.
The other two indexes that are most used in the literature are the Perception Corruption 
Index provided by Transparency International, and the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
of the World Bank. It is noteworthy that for our sample these indicators are highly correla-
ted with the ICRG index. The correlation between the ICRG and the Perception Corruption 
Index is 0.909, and with the mean of the six indicators of the World Bank is 0.920. 
3.2. Tourism Specialization
For the purposes of our work, an index is required that measures the impacts of tourism 
on economic activity. Since tourism is characterized by strong links with the rest of the 
economic activity (Dwyer et al., 2004; Ivanov and Webster, 2007; Kadiyali and Kosová, 
2013), not only do we want to consider direct impacts, but also both indirect and induced 
effects. 
Tourism Satellite Accounts (TSAs) are the main primary source for obtaining this 
data, and they provide full information about the impacts in terms of both income and 
employment. Currently, not all countries draw up their own TSAs. For more than 25 years, 
the World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC) and Oxford Economics have striven to 
fill this gap by carrying out annual economic impact research for a large sample of coun-
tries (WTTC, 2016). Their estimates are consistent with definitions specified in the UN 
Statistics Division-approved Tourism Satellite Account methodology (WTO, 2010) and 
they include data of total impacts (direct, indirect and induced). Currently, the WTTC 
can therefore be considered the most comprehensive available source of consistent cross-
country data on tourism linkages. 
Hence, in our work, to measure the tourism specialization, we use the total contribu-
tion of tourism employment offered by World Travel and Tourism Council and Oxford 
Economics: the number of jobs directly generated in the travel and tourism sector, plus 
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indirect and induced effects measured as a percentage of the total employment contribution 
to the economy.
We have chosen the contribution of employment since tourism is a very labour-intensive 
economic activity and, therefore, a major part of its effects on income distribution are pro-
duced in this way. As Lee and Kang (1998) state, tourism is a source of employment for dis-
criminated groups in the labour market: it offers opportunities for both low-skilled workers 
and women and enables workers to be transferred from the informal to the formal sector. 
3.3. Control variables
As control variables, we have chosen a group of determinants of the quality of institu-
tions, although economic factors have been excluded since they are included as channels 
through which tourism works on quality of institutions. The selection of the variables has 
been made depending on the availability of the data and the robustness of the results found 
in the literature. According to the classification in Section 2.2, we have chosen those stable 
and unstable elements that are well documented in the literature as determinants of quality 
of institutions. From the stable factors, the legal origin and the ethnical fractionalization 
have been selected, while from the unstable factors, we have chosen education, democracy 
and freedom of press.
Index of Ethnic Fractionalization 
Since Huntington (1968) stated the negative impact of a fractionalized society on the 
quality of government, a growing literature has striven to show a negative relation between 
fractionalization and quality of institutions (see Alesina and Ferrara (2005) for a review 
of the literature).
The index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization measures the probability that two ran-
domly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic 
group (Alesina et al., 2003: 158-159).
The most common index used in the literature (often referred to as ELF) was calculated 
by Taylor and Hudson (1972) and refers to 1960. Nevertheless, as Alesina et al. (2003: 156) 
point out, “these data rely largely on linguistic distinctions, which may obscure other aspect 
of ethnicity like racial origin, skin color, etc.” Therefore these authors provide a new measure 
of ethnic fragmentation and construct an index based strictly on language and another index 
based strictly on religion. While the ELF index is provided for 112 countries, the ethnic, reli-
gion and language fractionalization indexes constructed by Alesina et al. (2003) are available 
for 180, 198 and 185 countries, respectively. Furthermore, their ethnicity data refers to a 
period between 1983 and 2001 depending on the country, and the language and religion data 
to 2001. These characteristics have led us to select the fractionalization indexes in Alesina 
et al. (2003). In our sample, the correlation between the index of quality of institutions and 
the fractionalization indexes are -0.54, for the ethnic index, -0.34 for the language index, and 
0.11 for the religion index. As the ethnic index shows the highest level of autocorrelation, 
we have decided to introduce only this index into the model.
Legal Origin
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In a seminal paper, La Porta et al. (1999) show a systematic relation between legal origin 
and corruption. They identify five possible legal origins: the Common Law (British origin 
system), German commercial code, Scandinavian commercial law, the French commercial 
code (Civil law), and Socialist/communist law. It is argued that the Common Law, and, to a 
lesser extent German or Scandinavian systems, are based on a greater recognition of economic 
freedom and property rights, which limits state intervention in the economy. By contrast, the 
Civil Law and even more the Socialist/communist system were designed to determine the 
state’s ability to organize economic and social life, leading to a weaker recognition of prop-
erty rights and individual freedom. Accordingly, La Porta et al. (1999) show that countries 
whose legal system is based on the French legal origin exhibit greater corruption levels than 
countries with British and Nordic legal traditions. In our sample, there are 30 countries with 
legal origin in the English common law, 46 countries in the French tradition, 10 countries in 
the socialist tradition, 1 country in the German and 5 countries in the Scandinavian tradition 
(see Table A2 in Appendix 2). Therefore, we have included a dummy variable for English 
legal origin, a dummy variable for the French legal origin, and the excluded dummy variable 
includes countries with Socialist, German and Scandinavian legal traditions.
Education and Democracy
Alesina and Perotti (1996), Evans and Rauch (2000), Glaeser and Sacks (2006), and 
Alonso and Garcimartín (2013) find that education is positively related to quality of 
institutions. A more educated population demands institutions to be more transparent and 
efficient, is qualified to build these institutions, and is more sensitive to corruption pro-
blems. In this sense, Melgar et al. (2010: 125) found that “people who have completed, 
at least, secondary education are more likely to perceive a lower level of corruption. (…) 
More educated people have more information about the current level of corruption and 
better capabilities to process the information”. Following this result, we measure education 
with the average years of secondary education completed among adult people (aged 25 
and over). The data is taken from the Barro and Lee (2013) dataset.
Moreover, Fortunato and Panizza (2015) show that the marginal effect of education on 
the quality of institutions is significant in democratic countries, but it is not significant in 
non-democratic countries. This indicates that democracy channels the effects of a better 
education towards an improvement in the performance of the institutions. Based on this 
finding, we use the interaction between education and democracy as a control variable. 
Democracy is measured by an average of the Polity and Freedom House indexes of 
democracy and ranges between 0 and 10, where higher values are associated with higher 
levels of democracy.
Freedom of the Press
Adsera et al. (2003), Brunetti and Weder (2003), and Treisman (2007) find that free-
dom of the press helps fight against corruption, thereby contributing to the improvement in 
quality of institutions. We have measured this variable with an index provided by Freedom 
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House (available at Dahlberg et al., 2016) that reflects the political pressures and controls 
on media content. According to Dahlberg et al. (2016: 67), this index examines “the edi-
torial independence of both state-owned and privately owned media; access to information 
and sources; official censorship and self-censorship; the vibrancy of the media; the ability 
of both foreign and local reporters to cover the news freely and without harassment; and 
the intimidation of journalists by the state or other actors, including arbitrary detention and 
imprisonment, violent assaults, and other threats.” The index varies from 0 to 40 where 
0 indicates the most freedom.
3.4. Transmission channels
Level of Income
While it is true that the debate over the direction of the causality between institutions 
and growth will remain as long as macroeconomists exist, there seems to be a consensus 
in the literature concerning the association between lower corruption and higher economic 
development (see Treisman, 2007). In our paper, we will deem the level of income as a 
determinant of the quality of institutions, considering, as Alonso and Garcimartín (2013: 
210) point out, that a higher level of development provides the resources required to 
achieve better institutions and it entails an increase in the demand for quality institutions. 
Thus, we introduce the GDP per capita in PPP (purchasing power parity) in constant 2011 
international dollars, as taken from the World Bank.
Income Inequality 
Inequality in income distribution can be considered as an economic measure of the 
fragmentation of a society and, therefore, it has the same expected effect on the quality of 
institutions. The higher the fragmentation, the lower the quality of institutions: this arises 
because the groups in power use the institutions for their own interests instead of seeking 
the common good. Moreover, income inequality leads to social conflicts and political 
instability, which favour corruption, rent-seeking activities and, therefore, low-quality 
institutions. Alesina and Perotti (1996), Easterly (2001) and Alonso and Garcimarti (2013), 
among others, find evidence of this relationship.
As measures of inequality, we have chosen the Gini index (GINI) and the income 
share held by the lowest 20% of the population (L20), available at the World Bank. The 
Gini index ranges from 0, indicating perfect equality, to 100, indicating total inequality. 
Therefore, an increase in this index indicates a greater concentration of income. However, 
an increase in L20 indicates a higher percentage of income for the poorest section (in 
our estimates, the signs of the coefficients of these indices are expected to be opposite). 
Thus, although both indicators are measures of income distribution, their meanings are 
not exactly the same. L20 can complete the information offered by the Gini index on 
approaching poverty reduction. 
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Economic Freedom
The positive relation between economic freedom and quality of institutions is widely 
supported by the literature (see Faria et al., 2012 and the references therein). Nevertheless, 
the concept of economic freedom as described in the various papers is not exactly the same.
As Faria et al. (2012: 513-514) point out, economic freedom is related to the degree 
of protection of private property. This freedom is “enhanced by lower trade barriers, 
absence of price and foreign exchange controls, simplified taxation and regulation, rule 
of law, protection of property rights and sound money among others.” (Faria et al., 2012: 
515). Taking all this into account the economic freedom index provided by the Heritage 
Foundation, and available at Dahlberg et al. (2016), is considered to cover most of these 
issues. This index ranges from 0 to 100 (the maximum economic freedom). According to 
Dahlberg et al. (2016: 74-75), the components of this index are: Business freedom, Trade 
freedom, Fiscal freedom, Freedom from Government, Monetary freedom, Investment free-
dom, Financial freedom, Property rights, Freedom from corruption, and labour freedom.
 
International Openness
International openness could improve institutional quality given that it encourages a 
more competitive environment that prevents rent-seeking activities and requires the good 
functioning of the numerous legal and bureaucratic procedures. Nevertheless, the results 
on this issue are mixed. Ades and Di Tella (1999), and Leite and Weidmann (1999) support 
this link, while Treisman (2000) and Brunetti and Weder (2003) find no relation between 
the two variables. Rigobon and Rodrik (2004) and Islam and Montenegro (2002) find 
ambiguous results depending on the institutional quality variables used.
Despite this lack of clear support of the empirical evidence, we have decided to include 
international openness in our model since it could constitute a channel through which 
tourism affects the quality of institutions. As is usual in the literature, we have taken the 
sum of imports plus exports of goods and services as a percentage of the GDP. This data 
was extracted from the World Bank.
Table 1 provides a summary of all the variables included in the model, the index chosen 
for each of them, their acronyms, and the data source used. The descriptive statistic for 
the variables is summarized in Appendix 3 (Table A3).
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Table 1
DATA DESCRIPTION AND SOURCES
Name Variable Index/Description Source
ICRG Quality of 
institutions
ICRG: measure of quality of institutions; 
the mean of three indicators of 
‘corruption’, ‘law and order’ and 
‘bureaucracy quality’
Political Risk Services 
Group
TS Tourism 
specialization
Total contribution of tourism 
employment: number of jobs generated 
directly in the travel and tourism 
sector, plus indirect and induced effects 
measured as a percentage of the total 
employment contribution to the economy
World Travel and 
Tourism Council and
 Oxford Economics
FRAC Ethnic 
fractionalization
Index of ethnic fractionalization: the 
probability that two randomly selected 
people from a given country will not 
belong to the same ethnolinguistic group
Alesina et al. (2003)
COMMON 
LAW
FRENCH 
LAW
Legal origin Five possible legal origins: the Common 
law (British origin system), German 
commercial code, Scandinavian 
commercial law, the French commercial 
code (civil law), and Socialist/communist 
law
La Porta et al. (1999)
EDUC Education Average years of secondary education 
completed among adult people (aged 25 
and over)
Barro and Lee (2013) 
dataset
DEMOC Democracy Average of the Polity and Freedom 
House indices of democracy
Freedom House
FP Freedom of the 
press
Index Freedom of the press: reflects the 
political pressures and controls on media 
content
Freedom House
GDP Level of income Log of GDP per capita in PPP in constant 
2011 international dollars
World Development 
Indicator (World Bank)
GINI
L20
Income inequality - Gini index
- Income share held by lowest 20% of the 
population
World Development 
Indicator (World Bank)
EF Economic freedom Economic freedom index: This includes 
10 components (Business freedom, 
Trade freedom, Fiscal freedom, Freedom 
from government, Monetary freedom, 
Investment freedom Financial freedom, 
Property rights, Freedom from corruption, 
and labour freedom)
Heritage Foundation
OPEN International 
openness
Sum of imports plus exports of goods 
and services in percentage of the GDP
World Development 
Indicator (World Bank)
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4. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
In this section, the results for the total period 1995-2014 are presented. The results for 
each sub-period are detailed separately in Appendix 4. 
As a first step, we obtain the total effect (θ) of tourism on quality of institutions by esti-
mation using the OLS equation (1), where the transmission channels have been excluded. 
 (1)
Xi,t is the matrix of the control variables described in Section 3. Results in Table 2, 
column E(1) show that the total effect is positive and significant. If we compare the two 
periods it can be seen that in period 1 the total effect is slightly higher than in period 2 
(Appendix 4). These results support our first hypothesis (see Section 2.1) regarding the 
existence of a link between tourism specialization and the quality of institutions.
In order to test our second hypothesis (see Section 2.2), we decomposed the total effect 
(θ) into a direct effect of tourism on quality of institutions (denoted as α) and an indirect 
effect through the different channels, selected from the literature review and described in 
Section 3. This decomposition can be expressed as in (2):
(2)
where  is the indirect effect of tourism on ICRG through each selected 
channel j (CHj), that is, international openness, level of income, income inequality, and 
economic freedom.
As a previous condition to estimate both the direct and indirect effect, we have to 
test that the channels selected are determinants of quality of institutions. To this end, we 
include each plausible channel j in equation (1):
(3)
and we take into account the effects of tourism on ICRG through each channel by 
applying equation (4).
 (4)
where j is openness, GDP, income inequality, or economic freedom. We apply SURE 
to estimate the system with the two above equations (3 and 4).  Since, in this step, the 
relevant parameter is βj, we present only the results of the estimation of (3) for each 
channel j. These appear in Table 2, columns E2 to E6. OPEN is neither significant for the 
total period nor for the first period. For the second period OPEN is significant only at a 
10% level of significance (see Table A4.1b in Appendix 4). Thus, it is excluded from the 
analysis, and the channels selected are therefore GDP, income inequality (IQ) measured by 
Gini or L20, and EF. It is interesting to note that, as expected, when transmission variables 
are included, the magnitude and the level of significance of the direct effect of tourism on 
ICRG, estimated by α, decrease. This can be interpreted as an indirect support concerning 
the role of the transmission channels.
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Table 2
EFFECT OF TOURISM ON QUALITY OF INSTITUTIONS (1995-2014)
Dependent Variable:  Quality of   Institutions (ICRG)
E (1) E (2) E (3) E (4) E (5) E (6) E (7) E (8)
TS 0.192
***
(3.529)
0.181***
(3.312)
0.090*
(1.786)
0.138***
(2.622)
0.131***
(2.507)
0.185***
(3.554)
0.045
(0.959)
0.036
(0.769)
Channels:
OPEN 0.002(1.121)
GDP 0.897
***
(6.198)
0.725***
(5.152)
0.759***
(5.502)
GINI -0.048
***
(-4.114)
-0.052***
(-4.994)
L20 0.232
***
(4.499)
0.249***
(5.502)
EF 0.054
***
(3.443)
0.048***
(3.263)
0.044***
(5.532)
Control variables:
EDUC*DEMOC 0.065
***
(7.083)
0.062***
(6.704)
0.009
(0.782)
0.059***
(6.631)
0.063***
(7.183)
0.049***
(4.924)
0.0008
(0.071)
0.0036
(0.329)
FRAC -0.807*(-1.756)
-0.896**
(1.911)
-0.283
(-0.689)
-0.844**
(-1.983)
-0.871**
(-2.064)
-0.629
(-1.446)
-0.249
(0.663)
-0.260
(-0.702)
COMMON 
LAW
0.048
(0.135)
0.099
(0.274)
0.118
(0.667)
0.485
(1.562)
0.499*
(1.632)
-0.291
(-0.932)
0.269
(0.967)
0.305
(1.113)
FRENCH 
LAW
-0.465
(-1.296)
-0.447
(-1.250)
-0.796***
(-3.067)
0.054
(0.182)
0.163
(0.544)
-0.731***
(-2.578)
-0.426*
(-1.615)
-0.309
(-1.165)
FP -0.059
***
(-3.742)
-0.059***
(-3.652)
-0.070***
(5.071)
-0.054***
(-3.733)
-0.053***
(-3.671)
-0.041***
(-2.654)
-0.048***
(-3.490)
-0.048***
(3.542)
Constant: 5.263
***
(9.446)
5.160***
(8.325)
-1.297
(-1.103)
7.105***
(10.333)
3.581***
(5.613)
2.153**
(2.056)
-0.814
(0.665)
-4.662***
(-3.791)
N: observations 159 158 156 159 159 159 156 156
R2 0.688 0.689 0.754 0.716 0.722 0.708 0.791 0.797
Notes: ***,**,* denote that the coefficients are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics 
are given within parentheses. Column E(1) shows OLS estimation of equation (1). Columns E(2) to E(6) present 
the SUR estimation of equation (3) for each channel, while considering the system of equations that is compri-
sed of equations (3) and (4). Columns E(7) and E(8) show the SUR estimation of equation (5) in the system of 
equations (5) to (8), while considering the channels that are significant according to the results in E(2) to E(6).
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Once the three significant channels have been selected, we can calculate, on the one 
hand, the indirect effect of tourism on ICRG through each channel:  
where βj is the effect of each channel on ICRG and δj is the effect of tourism on each 
channel j.
On the other hand, the direct effect of tourism (α) can also be obtained, once the chan-
nels are taken into account. If we use the results of the system of equations (3) and (4), 
then the direct effect of tourism will be magnified, given that we have detracted the effect 
of one channel only. Therefore, it is more appropriate to analyze all channels simultane-
ously. This leads us to estimate the following system with four equations:
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
where CH is the matrix of the three channels considered and β is the vector of the 
estimated effect of the three channels on ICRG.  The estimation of (5) appears in Table 2, 
columns E(7) and E(8). The parameters ρGDP, ρIQ and ρEF are the vectors of the estimated 
coefficients of the control variables for each channel. The estimation of δGDP, δEF, ρGDP, and 
ρEF in equations (6) and (8) are very similar regardless of whether the Gini index or L20 
is considered in equation (7); in fact, they only change from the third decimal place. It is 
worth bearing in mind that neither do the estimations of the channels differ from those 
obtained in the system with (3) and (4). The results in Table 3 for equations (6) and (8) 
are for the equation system considering the Gini index in equation (7). With these estima-
tions, we can calculate expression (2).
Table 3
EFFECT OF TOURISM ON CHANNELS (1995-2014)
Dependent variable: Channels
GDP GINI L20 EF
TS 0.105***
(4.341)
-0.824***
(-2.845)
0.189***
(2.824)
0.147
(0.652)
EDUC*DEMOC 0.064***
(13.806)
-0.132**
(2.356)
0.012
(0.953)
0.287***
(6.589)
FRAC -0.625***
(-2.937)
-1.474
(-0.580)
0.412
(0.702)
-3.180*
(-1.608)
COMMON LAW 0.007
(0.053)
9.370***
(5.325)
-2.089***
(-5.137)
5.555***
(4.051)
FRENCH LAW 0.342**
(2.494)
10.297***
(6.304)
-2.633***
(6.975)
4.445***
(3.494)
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Dependent variable: Channels
GDP GINI L20 EF
FP 0.008
(1.073)
0.076
(0.837)
-0.017
(0.817)
-0.322***
(-4.523)
Constant 7.275***
(26.379)
37.953***
(11.543)
7.190***
(9.462)
57.364***
(22.400)
N: observations 176 179 179 179
R2 0.753 0.345 0.299 0.593
Notes: ***,**,* denote that the coefficients are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statis-
tics are given within parentheses. Columns GDP, GINI and EF present the SUR estimation of equations (6), (7) 
and (8), respectively, in the system of equations (5) to (8). Column L20 shows the SUR estimation of equation 
(7) in the system of equations comprised of equations (5) to (8).
Table 3 presents the results for the estimation of equations (6) to (8). These results 
show that the relation of tourism with each channel presents the expected sign and are con-
sistent with those found in the previous literature. Higher specialization in tourism leads to 
a higher GDP, as found in the review of the literature made by Pablo-Romero and Molina 
(2013), and leads to higher economic freedom in line with the conclusions in Das and Di 
Renzo (2010), Dwyer and Kim (2003), and Enright and Newton (2004, 2005). Moreover, 
there is a positive association between L20 and tourism and a negative association with the 
Gini index. Similar results appear in Croes and Vanegas (2008), Casas Jurado et al. (2012) 
and Lee and Kang (1998), but our findings contradict those in Leatherman and Marcouller 
(1996; 1999), Wagner (1997), Blake (2008), and Wattanakuljarus and Coxhead (2008). 
From these results, we summarize in Table 4 the estimation of direct and indirect 
effects of tourism on the quality of institutions. The estimations for each sub-period appear 
in Appendix 4, Tables A4.3a and 3b.  As can be seen, for the total period, more than 40% 
of the effect of tourism on ICRG is explained by the GDP. This percentage is lower in 
the first period and higher in the second period. With respect to income inequality, GDP 
explains approximately 25% of the total effect of tourism on the quality of institutions. 
Comparing the two sub-periods, the percentage explained both by Gini and L20 is slightly 
higher in the second period. Furthermore, results for Gini are slightly lower than those 
for L20 both in the total period and in the two sub-periods. As far as economic freedom 
is concerned, this explains around 5%, although there are major differences between 
periods. For the first period, economic freedom is hardly relevant (around 2%), while for 
the second period it is more relevant (around 15%). Nevertheless, δEF is not significant 
and therefore these results must be viewed cautiously. The direct effect of tourism, or at 
least the effects that cannot be explained by these channels, stand at around 20%, higher 
in the first period and lower in the second, due to the differences in the relevance of the 
economic freedom. 
Our results are compatible with those obtained by Lee (2015) who found a positive 
association between the quality of institutions and tourism competitiveness. In the same 
vein, Das and Di Renzo (2010) and Poprawe (2015) found a negative impact of corruption 
on tourism.
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Finally, it is also worth noting that, in all regressions in Table 2, the estimates for 
control variables, when significant, show the expected sign and are consistent with the 
existing literature on the determinants of the quality of institutions. 
5. CONCLUSIONS
This study has introduced a new perspective on the impacts of tourism on host com-
munities by analyzing the links between the tourism specialization of a country and its 
institutional quality. Building on the literature review, we have proposed hypotheses and 
the theoretical model. An econometric analysis has been carried out using panel data on 
92 countries from 1995 to 2014. The empirical analysis has enabled us to find a positive 
and significant association between tourism specialization and institutional quality. 
After having confirmed the links between tourism and institutional quality, we explored 
the transmission channels through which those links could occur. This paper, to the best of 
our knowledge, is the first to study these transmission channels. Initially, we have chosen, 
from among the determinants of institutional quality, those with a clearer connection with 
tourism: level of income, income inequality, economic freedom and international openness. 
Our empirical analysis found international openness to be non-significant and it was hence 
excluded from the analysis. This research leads to the conclusion that the relationship bet-
ween tourism and institutional quality is mainly produced through three channels. The first 
channel is the income level that explains around the 40% of this relation. In fact, tourist 
activity fosters the income of the economy where it develops, which has a positive effect 
on the quality of institutions. The second channel is the income inequality. In this case, as 
tourism is of a labour-intensive nature, it absorbs many unskilled and semi-skilled workers 
and female workers. In this sense, the tourism employment is more likely to reduce income 
inequality because it improves living standards for those of a lower income. Our results show 
that this channel explains approximately the 25% of the total effect of tourism on the quality 
of institutions. Finally, the contribution of economic freedom is significant but residual (4%).
These findings have potentially important implications for economic policy. On the one 
hand, these results broaden the knowledge of the impacts of tourism on host communities, 
thereby enabling tourism managers to carry out better tourism planning. On the other 
hand, these results extend the knowledge on the links with institutional quality and this 
allows policy-makers to be aware of more elements upon which to base their decisions 
regarding this matter.
The existence of synergies between tourism and institutional quality found in this 
paper implies that if measures are taken to increase quality of institutions (fight against 
corruption, reduction of bureaucracy, strengthening of the legal system, among others), 
they can result in a significant improvement in tourist activity. Similarly, economies that 
opt  for a specialization in the tourism sector will find incentives to improve the quality 
of their institutions; which in turn, may imply a higher quality of life for its inhabitants. 
Given the implications of the topic analysed in this work, for future research it could be 
useful to deepen in several aspects. On the one hand, the specific links of tourism activity 
with each of the components of institutional quality should be studied. As pointed out in 
the paper, institutional quality is a very broad concept that includes dimensions such as 
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corruption, bureaucracy or law and order. Therefore, it could be interesting to analyse if 
the links of each of these dimensions with tourism activity are still significant and positive 
and on which of them the tourism specialization has the greatest impacts. On the other 
hand, it would also be relevant to carry out a similar study disaggregating the tourism 
specialization into the specific type of tourism developed. This would allow us to know to 
what extent the characteristics of tourism show different relationships with the quality of 
the institutions. Finally, another extension of interest is to analyze if there are significant 
differences in the results when data are disaggregated at a regional or local level. 
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APPENDIX 1
Table A1
COUNTRIES
Albania
Algeria (1)
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bangladesh
Belgium
Benin
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Central African Republic
Chile
China
Colombia
Congo, Democratic Republic
Costa Rica
Côte D’Ivoire
Cyprus
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Fiji
Finland
France
Gambia (1)
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Guyana (1)
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica (1)
Jordan
Kenya
Lao
Lesotho
Luxembourg
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Mexico
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Nepal
Netherlands
Nicaragua
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Swaziland
Sweden
Syrian Arab Republic 
(1)
Tanzania
Thailand
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
United Kingdom
United States Of 
America
Uruguay
Venezuela
Viet Nam
Zambia
Note: (1) Data available only for the first period (1995-2004).
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APPENDIX 2
Table A2
LEGAL ORIGIN
Common Law
Australia
Bangladesh
Botswana
Canada
Cyprus
Fiji
Gambia
Ghana
Guyana
India
Ireland
Israel
Jamaica
Kenya
Lesotho
Malawi
Malaysia
Nepal
Pakistan
Papua New Guinea
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Sri Lanka
Swaziland
Tanzania, United Republic Of
Thailand
Uganda
United Kingdom
United States Of America
Zambia
French Commercial Law
Algeria
Argentina 
Belgium 
Benin
Bolivia
Brazil
Burundi
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Chile
Colombia
Congo, Democratic Republic 
Costa Rica
Côte D’Ivoire
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
France
Greece
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Indonesia
Iran, Islamic Republic Of
Italy
Jordan
Luxembourg
Mali
Mexico
Morocco
Mozambique
Netherlands
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru 
Philippines 
Portugal
Rwanda
Senegal
Spain
Syrian Arab Republic
Tunisia
Turkey
Uruguay
Venezuela
Socialist Law
Albania
Bulgaria
Cambodia
China
Hungary
Lao 
Mongolia
Poland
Romania
Viet Nam
German Law
Austria
Scandinavian 
Commercial Law
Denmark
Finland
Iceland
Norway
Sweden
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APPENDIX 3
Table A3
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTIC
 Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. Observations
ICRG  5.760  9.955  1.262  2.112  159
TS  3.701  11.767  0.577  2.008  179
FRAC  0.419  0.930  0.039  0.260  179
EDUC  2.292  5.640  0.095  1.406  179
DEMOC  7.117  10.000  0.500  2.696  179
FP  17.355  35.900  2.000  8.943  179
OPEN  76.860  335.249  22.086  42.730  158
GDP  14,630.19  90,792.38  557.953  16,076.90  176
GINI  41.308  64.730  25.890  9.188  179
L20  6.004  9.410  1.700  2.052  179
EF  60.367  81.762  36.900  9.082  179
Notes: ICRG: Quality of institutions; TS: Tourism specialization; FRAC: Ethnic fractionalization; EDUC: Educa-
tion; DEMOC: Democracy; FP: Freedom of the press; OPEN: International openness; GDP: Income level; GINI: 
Gini index; L20: Income share held by lowest 20% of the population; EF: Economic freedom.
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APPENDIX 4
Table A4.1a
EFFECT OF TOURISM ON QUALITY OF INSTITUTIONS (1995-2004)
Dependent Variable:   Quality of   Institutions (ICRG)
E (1) E (2) E (3) E (4) E (5) E (6) E (7) E (8)
TS 0.225
***
(3.034)
0.222***
(2.975)
0.119**
(1.940)
0.171***
(2.611)
0.167**
(2.562)
0.231***
(3.664)
0.084
(1.450)
0.078
(1.355)
Channels:
OPEN 0.002(0.704)
GDP 0.859
***
(4.787)
0.669***
(3.751)
0.610***
(3.932)
GINI -0.041
***
(-2.874)
-0.045***
(3.553)
L20 0.191
***
(3.060)
0.210***
(3.863)
EF 0.050
***
(2.634)
0.043**
(2.402)
0.042**
(2.364)
Control variables:
EDUC*DEMOC 0.081
***
(6.361)
0.081***
(6.392)
0.025
(1.542)
0.074***
(6.646)
0.077***
(6.023)
0.070***
(5.221)
0.020
(1.378)
0.022
(1.523)
FRAC -0.548(-0.956)
-0.555
(-0.971)
-0.086
(-0.169)
-0.632
(-1.170)
-0.667
(-1.241)
-0.254
(-0.458)
-0.023
(-0.049)
-0.051
(-0.110)
COMMON 
LAW
-0.193
(-0.413)
-0.208
(-0.441)
-0.109
(0.320)
0.240
(0.603)
0.281
(0.707)
-0.625
(-1.540)
-0.028
(-0.079)
0.032
(0.090)
FRENCH 
LAW
-0.543
(-1.220)
-0.544
(-1.291)
-0.920***
(-2.843)
-0.045
(-0.119)
0.060
(0.155)
-0.933**
(-2.510)
-0.643**
(-1.900)
-0.522
(-1.516)
FP -0.032(-1.609)
-0.029
(-1.486)
-0.039**
(-2.287)
-0.033*
(-1.825)
-0.033*
(-1.836)
-0.012
(-0.594)
-0.023
(-1.330)
-0.023
(-1.372)
Constant: 4.739
***
(6.501)
4.549***
(6.689)
-1.460
(-0.998)
6.462***
(7.156)
3.494***
(4.451)
1.757
(1.331)
-0.824
(-0.548)
-4.135***
(-2.763)
N: observations 82 82 90 92 92 92 92 92
R2 0.718 0.717 0.784 0.741 0.744 0.737 0.813 0.818
Notes: ***,**,* denote that the coefficients are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statis-
tics are given within parentheses. Column E(1) shows OLS estimation of equation (1). Columns E(2) to E(6) 
present the SUR estimation of equation (3) for each channel, while considering the system of equations that 
is comprised of equations (3) and (4). Columns E(7) and E(8) show the SUR estimation of equation (5) in the 
system of equations (5) to (8), while considering the channels that are significant according to the results in 
E(2) to E(6).
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Table A4.2a
EFFECT OF TOURISM ON THE CHANNELS 
(1995-2004)
Dependent variable: Channels
GDP GINI L20 EF
TS 0.108***
(3.076)
-1.155***
(-2.754)
0.263***
(2.271)
0.084*
(1.666)
EDUC*DEMOC 0.067***
(9.001)
-0.194**
(-2.159)
0.026
(1.268)
0.219***
(3.001)
FRAC -0.643**
(-2.168)
-3.424
(-0.956)
0.899
(1.088)
-4.854*
(-1.665)
COMMON LAW 0.011
(0.054)
11.063***
(4.459)
-2.614***
(-4.570)
7.721***
(3.824)
FRENCH LAW 0.410**
(2.154)
11.696***
(2.300)
-3.084***
(-5.813)
7.180***
(3.836)
FP 0.000
(0.074)
-0.047
(-0.364)
0.013
(0.458)
-0.426***
(-4.070)
Constant 7.353***
(18.825)
41.794***
(8.899)
6.370***
(5.881)
59.532**
(15.590)
N: observations 90 92 92 92
R2 0.750 0.355 0.326 0.543
Notes: ***,**,* denote that the coefficients are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The t-sta-
tistics are given within parentheses. Columns GDP, GINI, and EF present the SUR estimation of equations 
(6), (7) and (8) respectively, in the system of equations (5) to (8). Column L20 shows the SUR estimation of 
equation (7) in the system of equations comprised of equations (5) to (8).
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Table A4.1b
EFFECT OF TOURISM ON QUALITY OF INSTITUTIONS  
(2005-2014)
Dependent Variable:   Quality of   Institutions (ICRG)
E (1) E (2) E (3) E (4) E (5) E (6) E (7) E (8)
TS 0.162
**
(2.007)
0.146*
(1.794)
0.079
(1.054)
0.106
(1.365)
0.093
(1.210)
0.129*
(1.690)
0.014
(0.211)
0.002
(0.034)
Channels:
OPEN 0.004
*
(1.817)
GDP 0.943
***
(4.368)
0.710***
(3.554)
0.761***
(3.894)
GINI -0.06
***
(-3.344)
-0.062***
(-4.177)
L20 0.300
***
(3.675)
0.300***
(4.501)
EF 0.076
***
(3.202)
0.068***
(3.137)
0.060***
(2.833)
Control variables:
EDUC*DEMOC 0.074
***
(5.739)
0.071***
(4.983)
0.013
(0.720)
0.071***
(5.680)
0.076***
(6.131)
0.051***
(3.489)
0.005
(0.308)
0.008
(0.555)
FRAC -0.807(-1.143)
-0.952
(-1.280)
-0.210
(-0.352)
-0.815
(-1.357)
-0.838
(-1.414)
-0.724
(-1.198)
-0.249
(-0.478)
-0.241
(-0.470)
COMMON 
LAW
0.287
(0.534)
0.430
(0.784)
0.323
(0.820)
0.738*
(1.715)
0.702*
(1.674)
-0.022
(-0.053)
0.505
(1.365)
0.486
(1.342)
FRENCH 
LAW
-0.313
-0.555
-0.259
-0.464
-0.616*
-1.649
0.242
0.586
0.344
0.830
-0.461
-1.200
-0.109
-0.307
-0.028
-0.079
FP -0.053
**
(-2.008)
-0.05*
(-1.833)
-0.077***
(-3.346)
-0.037
(-1.579)
0.033
(-1.402)
-0.028
(-1.148)
-0.033
(-1.473)
-0.033
(-1.511)
Constant: 4.561
***
(5.700)
4.249***
(4.392)
-2.144
(-1.253)
6.526***
(6.660)
2.234**
(2.234)
0.160
(0.101)
-2.293
(-1.310)
-6.693***
(-3.799)
N: observations 77 76 76 77 77 77 76 76
R2 0.694 0.698 0.751 0.728 0.735 0.726 0.974 0.810
Notes: ***,**,* denote that the coefficients are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statis-
tics are given within parentheses. Column E(1) shows OLS estimation of equation (1). Columns E(2) to E(6) 
present the SUR estimation of equation (3) for each channel, while considering the system of equations that 
is comprised of equations (3) and (4). Columns E(7) and E(8) show the SUR estimation of equation (5) in the 
system of equations (5) to (8), while considering the channels that are significant according to the results in 
E(2) to E(6).
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TABLE A4.2b
EFFECT OF TOURISM ON THE CHANNELS
(2005-2014)
Dependent variable: Channels
GDP GINI L20 EF
TS 0.090***
(2.709)
-0.592*
(-1.662)
0.142*
(1.665)
0.331*
(1.663)
EDUC*DEMOC 0.067***
(10.296)
-0.080
(-1.036)
0.000
(0.013)
0.313***
(5.633)
FRAC -0.615**
(-2.056)
0.026
(0.007)
0.041
(0.050)
-2.069
(-0.810)
COMMON LAW 0.013
(0.066)
7.906***
(3.217)
-1.613***
(-2.850)
3.575**
(2.031)
FRENCH LAW 0.275
(1.436)
9.073***
(3.975)
-2.221***
(-4.226)
1.732
(1.060)
FP 0.023**
1.932
0.200
1.397
-0.050
-1.516
-0.271***
-2.635
Constant 7.008***
(16.894)
34.232***
(6.896)
8.007***
(7.007)
57.015***
(16.041)
N: observations 86 87 87 87
R2 0.747 0.307 0.245   0.649
Notes: ***,**,* denote that the coefficients are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The t-statistics 
are given within parentheses. Columns GDP, GINI and EF present the SUR estimation of equations (6), (7) and 
(8) respectively, in the system of equations (5) to (8). Column L20 shows the SUR estimation of equation (7) 
in the system of equations comprised of equations (5) to (8).
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